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Martti Ahtisaari Speaks to Fulbrighters |
| Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, |
| It is a great honor to be awarded the J. William Fulbright Prize for
International Understanding. The list of past recipients of this prize is truly
impressive and I feel privileged to be in such company. |
| I am particularly pleased to receive an award whose first recipient was Nelson
Mandela. In accepting the inaugural Fulbright Prize in 1993 President Mandela
called Fulbright Program participants 'men and women who have chosen the world
to be the theater of their efforts.' He observed that Fulbright and other
international educational exchange programs have now produced generations of men
and women who are not satisfied with addressing and solving problems only within
the borders of their own countries. It is upon the vision, skills and
dedication of such people that we must call to solve today's conflicts.
In my office, I have two paintings and a piece of quarry rock from Robben Island
given to me by President Mandela. The maximum security prison on Robben Island
is where Mandela spent the bulk of his 27 year imprisonment. The piece of rock
symbolizes for me the persistence and determination that can overcome even the
greatest difficulties. It reminds my visitors and me daily that no problem is
too difficult to be solved. This lesson of persistence is one that I would like
to carry across to my own continent. |
| I plan to speak to you today about my experience of conflict resolution in
Kosovo and about the future prospects of the Balkan region. The Balkans have
been in the spotlight of international attention throughout the past decade. The
disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in four armed conflicts – on the
territories of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – and in
immeasurable human suffering. We have all witnessed what inciting hatred and
intolerance can lead to. |
| More recently, two months ago, we also had the privilege to witness in Serbia
the toppling in an election of the man who carries much of the responsibility
for the violence and destruction. With the removal of Slobodan Milosevic from
power, new possibilities have opened up for stability and prosperity in
Yugoslavia and throughout the Balkan region. Elections have also brought
moderate forces into power in Croatia and Kosovo. Montenegro has held its
reformist course. Bosnia-Herzegovina is recovering slowly. Albania and Macedonia
have resisted being destabilized. |
| These gains must now be consolidated. This will require long-term involvement
and a joint high intensity strategy in the region by the United States and the
European Union countries. I will return to some of the concrete regional
challenges towards the end of my speech. |
| The Kosovo Peace Process |
| But I will start with my mission in the spring of 1999. My involvement in the
Kosovo peace process was fairly short, only about eight weeks. It started with a
phone call from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on 5 May 1999 and
finished with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and the subsequent
ending of the NATO bombing campaign. This was an extremely intensive time period
with a lot of excitement and great speed. For many of my team, the night we
spent in Belgrade after presenting the terms of the peace offer to President Milosevic was the first full night’s sleep for weeks. |
| By the beginning of May the crisis had become more and more problematic for the
international community. The air strikes had been in progress for several weeks,
but it was increasingly obvious that bombing alone would not lead to a military
solution. Although diplomatic efforts had already failed once, it became
necessary to step up the search for a political solution. |
| The initiative to involve me in this process emerged from talks between the
Americans and the Russians in Washington in early May. They considered it
necessary to bring in a third party. Soon after they contacted me, I discussed
the matter also with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Germany held the EU Presidency
at the time and the Chancellor proposed that I represent the Union as a whole in
efforts to resolve the crisis. I saw this as the only sensible solution. |
| Naturally, I considered it my duty to agree to the request made to me in early
May. However, I did not consider my prospects to be very promising. Already
during the first round of contacts, it became evident that there were
substantial differences of view on the terms that might form the basis for a
solution. That was what made it so important to get American, Russian and EU
representatives around the same table to discuss their differences. |
| My approach in these trilateral talks between the teams of Deputy Secretary
Talbott, President Yeltsin’s special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and myself was
simple: rather than becoming wrapped up in questions of prestige, we would
concentrate on issues that were both practical and central. How could the
conditions in which the refugees could return safely be created? What kind of
presence would the international community have? How would the withdrawal of the
Serbian forces be effected? What would be the nature of the interim
international administration? |
| I had been convinced from the outset that an international presence would be
credible only if it had a robust mandate and if it was based on contributions
from the core NATO countries and also NATO-led. It was necessary to have
American, British, French and German troops participating in the Kosovo
peacekeeping force. Otherwise the refugees would not dare to return to their
homes. Eventually, also the Russians accepted these principles, or at least
their core elements. |
| In these negotiations, Strobe Talbott was indefatigable in his efforts to
analyze the ever-changing and complicated situation and to find a solution. His
imagination and diplomatic skills were absolutely essential to taking things
forward. The Russians suggested to me at one point that Talbott be replaced by
either State Secretary Albright or Vice President Gore, but I thrust aside this
idea by saying that it was important to have someone who knew the substance and
had the full confidence of his President. |
| The achievement of agreement between NATO and the Russians made it possible for
me to go to Belgrade with Viktor Chernomyrdin in the beginning of June. Four
weeks of constant hard work yielded fruit: there was not the slightest
disagreement between us when we presented the peace offer to President
Milosevic. |
| Mr. Chernomyrdin and I carefully outlined the content of the peace offer to the
Yugoslav political and military leaders and, after we had replied to their
questions, they withdrew to consider their response. The following day, the
offer that we had brought was presented to the Serbian Parliament and the
Yugoslav Federal Government, both of which accepted it. |
| Diplomacy or Bombs? |
| The question about what made Milosevic accept the term of the peace offer has
often been phrased in terms of juxtaposition. Was it diplomacy or bombs that
ended the war? |
| I still think that, irrespective of the actual damage done by the air strikes,
the bombing campaign achieved its central aim. It demonstrated that the NATO
countries involved were serious. I am certain that Milosevic would not have
accepted the offer with which I went to Belgrade, had it not been for the
bombings. He may also have been aware of the increased readiness of some of the
NATO allies to send in ground troops. |
| The evidence has also led me to believe that the Russians had their own plan for
Kosovo, of which Milosevic was aware. This could have been another factor in the
rapid acceptance of the peace settlement by the Yugoslavs. In the negotiations
for the composition of the Kosovo Force, the Russians had insisted on having a
separate Russian sector in Kosovo. When they were unable to secure agreement for
their demand, the Russian military made a dash for the Pristina airport and
arrived there before the British and American troops. I have come to believe
that the plan by the Russian military was to hold parts of Northern Kosovo and
the capital Pristina with the support of Russian troops. This might have led to
the eventual division of Kosovo. |
| The secret plan of the military did not succeed. Its implementation was
prevented by the refusal of the neighboring states of Yugoslavia to allow the
Russians to use their airspace. They were thus unable to send reinforcements and
provide logistics for the troops at Pristina airport. The stand-off between the
Russian and British troops at Pristina airport continued over the period of a
few days, however, and the Russians tried to use their soldiers as a means of
bargaining for a more significant role within the Kosovo Force. |
| Now that things have settled, the Russians have participated in KFOR in a
committed and constructive manner. I have often heard the claim that I saved
NATO. But as I told a Russian journalist just two weeks ago in Moscow, we in
fact also saved Russia. Had the agreement not been reached, it would have
brought even more forcefully forward the doubt that the Russians did not share
the same values as the United States and the Europeans. This would have isolated
Russia – to everyone’s detriment. |
| n the aftermath of my involvement in the Kosovo negotiations, I have given
quite a bit of thought to the concept of humanitarian intervention – which is
what the Kosovo bombings amounted to. |
| Humanitarian Intervention |
| I do not count myself among those who hold onto the concept of sovereignty in
its old sense. In my view, the highest source of sovereign power rests with the
people of a state. I strongly believe that if a government flagrantly violates
the human rights of its people, outsiders have the right to intervene on behalf
of the people – always when possible with the blessing of the UN Security
Council. With the genocidal crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in fresh memory, there
was no need to second-guess the readiness of Milosevic’s regime for violence in
Kosovo. |
| The Kosovo crisis showed that the populations in Western democracies no longer
tolerate such levels of violence. Everyone was able to witness from their own
living rooms the columns of refugees fleeing Kosovo and the cruelty and human
suffering caused by Milosevic’s tactics. The pressure to act was enormous.
People demanded that something had to be done. |
| Milosevic's Defeat |
| I believe that Serbian society has now itself begun reflecting on the crimes
committed in its name. There have been some very brave and forthright
individuals who have spoken out about the atrocities that members of the
Yugoslav special forces committed in Kosovo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in
Croatia. |
| I believe that this new mood was also one of the causes for the revolt against
Milosevic during the first week of October. Since the beginning of this year,
polls in Yugoslavia had been showing that Milosevic’s support base had
collapsed. Milosevic himself was too isolated from the lives of ordinary
citizens to understand the profound change that had occurred in Serbian society.
Once the opposition was able to unite around a single candidate, Vojislav
Kostunica, the opinion polls consistently predicted an opposition victory.
Still, defeat seemed to come as a complete surprise to Milosevic himself, as
well as to many Western leaders and the leaders of neighboring countries.
A poll publicized on 5 September this year showed Kostunica in a 2:1 lead over
Milosevic. In discussions with members of the democratic forces of Serbia I
became convinced beyond a doubt that the poll data was correct. And I was
worried about the possibility of violence in the face of the opposition’s
victory. |
| On the occasion of handing over the report on Austria’s human rights situation
to President Jacques Chirac on Friday, 8 September, I told him that the Serbian
opposition would win: what would the West do if Milosevic were to open fire on
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators? I also called up Prime Minister Tony
Blair and handed over a memo on the situation to American policy makers. I saw
that it was important to sound a wake-up call to the West to recognize a new
situation and to prepare for the change of power in Yugoslavia.
When Milosevic tried to obfuscate the result to get a second round, most
political observers in the West believed that he would cling to power with the
support of the army and police. At the same time, already during the counting of
the votes, it had become clear that even the great majority of the security
forces supported Kostunica over Milosevic. The Serbian opposition supporters
took heart when seeing that the police refrained from using force against the
striking miners in Kolubara. The police stood by again on 5 October in Belgrade
when the crowds took over the Federal parliament building. |
| Post-Election Challenges |
| After the jubilation in Belgrade over Kostunica’s victory, the real challenges
for the region of course remain. These include the rebuilding the economies of
both Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, of creating democratic
administrative structures and institutions, and bringing a functioning civil
society into being. They also include resolving questions on the status of
Montenegro and Kosovo in relation to Yugoslavia and creating a functioning state
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. |
| The key now is to maintain the level of engagement by the Western countries in
supporting the region on its road to stability and prosperity. Milosevic has
left the economy of Serbia in ruins. The state reserves had dwindled to a mere
350 million dollars. Serbia’s energy debt to Russia alone was some 400-450
million dollars. The other economies in the region have also been hit extremely
hard. The job of reforming and building the institutions to enable economic
recovery will not be an easy one. |
| We must be prepared to remain involved for the long term, for ten or twenty
years – until the job is done. Our joint commitment to the Balkan region must be
no less than that of the commitment of the United States in building up Western
Europe after the Second World War. A stable, democratic and prosperous Europe,
at last united, is a vision shared by all of us. |
| The Future of the Balkans |
| Rebuilding key public institutions is the most urgent need of both Serbia and
all of its neighbors. Without a solid institutional framework for the exercise
of public power, free and fair elections will not lead to representative or
accountable government. Without effective institutions to implement the rule of
law, states will not be able to provide protection of human rights and minority
rights. Without stable economic regulatory structures to establish a climate
favorable to business enterprise, neither privatization nor trade liberalization
will generate sustainable economic growth. |
| The countries of the region face major difficulties in reforming themselves, and
may become trapped in a cycle of unsuccessful reforms. Weak public
administrations are called on to carry out reforms that are beyond their human
and budgetary resources. The countries of the region are unlikely to be able to
emerge from this cycle without significant external assistance. |
| Reforming Core Institutions |
| It is important to set clear priorities and to concentrate resources on
reforming the core state institutions, among which are reliable law enforcement
structures, a functioning central bank with stable fiscal and monetary policy,
and tax and customs administrations capable of collecting revenue for the state
budget. |
| The traditional democratization approach stresses the development of the NGO and
independent media sectors. These are important as a healthy counterbalance to
state power, but as long as the state itself is unable even to deliver basic
public goods and services, such as providing for the rule of law, the role of
civil society remains limited. |
| The challenge for all of us is to find more high-intensity ways to help
strengthen public institutions in South Eastern Europe. This is the most direct
way of addressing a range of international objectives, from economic development
to promoting responsible governance. It is also the only path to long-term
political stability in the region. |
| Senator Fulbright's Vision |
| In the beginning of this speech I spoke of the rewards of persistence. After the
Second World War, the political leaders had a vision, which brought stability,
prosperity and democracy to war-torn societies of Europe. Among those leaders
was Senator J. William Fulbright. Last year the U.S.-Finnish Fulbright exchange
marked its 50th anniversary. I would like to salute this exceptional program
for the educational and cultural opportunities it has given to my compatriots
and to the Americans who have come to Finland under its auspices. Throughout the
world more than 200,000 individuals have participated in Fulbright exchanges. I
share Ambassador Eric Edelman's view that the Fulbright Program is one of the
United States' 'premier vehicles for intellectual engagement with the rest of
the world and one of its wisest investments in the international arena.'
What is needed now is a similar vision and commitment, because the task still
ahead of us in stabilizing the Balkans is even more complicated and demanding.
We have no alternative but to persist. |
| Thank you. |
| Presented Dec. 1, 2000 at a ceremony at the International Trade Center,
Washington, D.C. |
| See also: |
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